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SECURITIES LAW 
A REMEDY WITHOUT A RIGHT: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT DENIES A PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 17(A) 
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In In Re Washington Public Power Supply System Securi-
ties Litigation 1 the Ninth Circuit overruled2 its previous pro-
plaintiff positionS by holding that a private plaintiff does not 
have an implied right of action under the broad antifraud provi-
sions of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.4 With this 
1. 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987)(en banc)(per Hall, J.; the other panel members were 
Anderson, J., Brunetti, J., Kennedy, J., Kozinski, J., Nelson, J., Norris, J., Thompson, J., 
Wiggins, J., and Tang, J., dissenting). A partial settlement was announced on September 
10, 1987. The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 1987, at 3, col. 3. Under the terms of 
the settlement, which is still subject to court approval, four brokerage firms and other 
syndicates that underwrote Washington Public Power Supply System's $2,250,000,000 
bond offering agreed to pay bondholders $92,000,000 to settle a class action lawsuit. ld. 
In reaching the settlement the defendants did not admit or concede fault or liability 
regarding allegations that the bonds were sold with official statements that were materi-
ally misleading. ld. Thus, the settlement does not affect the issues discussed in this note. 
ld. A jury trial involving all remaining defendants is scheduled to start in September 
1988. ld. 
2. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d at 1358 [hereinaf-
ter WPPSSj. 
3. Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra 
note 20 and accompanying text. 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of 
any securities by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by 
the use of the mails directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
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holding, the Ninth Circuit has joined a growing trend among the 
circuits. I> The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this question,S 
but it has placed heavy restrictions on a private right of action 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 
which is very similar to section 17(a). The restrictive view to-
ward a private right of action under section 17(a) adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit further circumscribes the opportunities for a pri-
vate plaintiff to recover damages suffered in a fraudulent or mis-
leading securities transaction. 
II. FACTS 
Plaintiffs purchased bonds issued by the Washington Public 
Power Supply System (WPPSS). The proceeds were used to fi-
nance the construction of two nuclear power plants, WPPSS 4 
and WPPSS 5.8 WPPSS is a joint action agency consisting of 19 
public utility districts and the cities of Ellensburg, Richland, Se-
attle and Tacoma, which are all located in the State of Washing-
ton.9 WPPSS issued a total of $2.25 billion of debt between 1977 
and 1981 and became the nation's largest issuer of tax-free mu-
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon the purchaser. 
5. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
6. The Supreme Court has expressly reserved this question on five separate occa-
sions. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304 n.9 (1985); Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 
(1979); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979); 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 n.6 (1975). 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national s"E!curi-
ties exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. 
8. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1350. 
·9. SHEARSON/AMERICAN EXPRESS. INC. Washington Public Power Supply System 
Straight Answers To The 30 Most Asked Questions. (1983). 
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nicipal bonds.lo Plagued by huge construction cost overruns and 
uncertain demand for the power plants' output, all construction 
on plants 4 and 5 was suspended in January 198211 and eventu-
ally terminated,u In July 1983, WPPSS defaulted on the 
WPPSS 4 and WPPSS 5 bond obligations, creating the largest 
municipal bond default in United States history.13 Alleging that 
the bonds were sold in violation of both federal and state securi-
ties laws, plaintiffs filed a class action suit against WPPSS and 
nearly 200 other defendants on behalf of themselves and all 
others who purchased the bonds between February 23, 1977 and 
June 15, 1983.14 
In the fall of 1983 defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' 
section 17(a) claims. III Judge Browning vacated the substantive 
motions previously ruled upon by Judge Bilbyl6 and granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs' section 17(a) 
claims on December 3, 1985.17 Recognizing that this decision 
conflicted with the then prevailing Ninth Circuit authority, 
Judge Browning certified his interlocutory order for immediate 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b).18 Plaintiffs then 
successfully petitioned the Ninth Circuit for permission to file 
an interlocutory appeal.19 Relying on Stephenson v. Calpine Co-
10. The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1983, at 3, col. 1. 
11. The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1983, at 18, col. 1. 
12. The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1984, at 6, col. 1. 
13. The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1983, at 3, col. 1. 
14. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1349. 
15. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 
(W.D.Wash.1987). District Judge Richard Bilby denied the motion in December 1983. 
WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1350. In January 1985, Judge Bilby learned that his father and 
stepmother owned $100,000 in WPPSS bonds. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 623 F. 
Supp. at 1470. Because of this possible conflict of interest, Judge Bilby recused himself 
and was replaced by District Judge William Browning. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1350. 
16. WPPSS, 623 F. Supp. at 1470. 
17. Id. at 1474. 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1984) provides: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order 
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the 
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law 
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materi-
ally advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he 
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals 
may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken 
from such order. . . . 
19. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1350. 
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nifers II Ltd.,20 the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs' motion for 
a summary reversal of District Judge Browning's dismissal of 
the section 17(a) claims.21 An en banc rehearing was then 
granted to reconsider the right of private plaintiffs to bring an 
action pursuant to section 17(a) under Stephenson.22 
III. BACKGROUND 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in WPPSS denying a private 
right of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 
continues a trend23 away from an expansive approach to judi-
cially implied private rights of action. A previous, liberal atti-
tude is exemplified by the Supreme Court's 1964 ruling in J.I. 
Case v. Borak.24 In Borak, the Supreme Court recognized an im-
plied right of action in the proxy provisions of the 1934 Securi-
ties Exchange Act.211 It held that such private remedies were nec-
essary to ensure full disclosure in shareholder proxy 
statements.26 Citing investor protection as the chief purpose of 
the 1934 Act,27 the Court stated that individual lawsuits were 
20. Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981)(plaintiffs, 
investors in a failed limited partnership, brought an action under the Securities Act of 
1933 and under certain California statutes). The Stephenson court held that a private 
cause of action exists under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. 
77q(a)(1976). 
21. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1350. 
22. Id. 
23. See infra note 55, and accompanying text. 
24. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Borak involved a civil action brought for alleged depriva-
tion of preemptive rights by reason of a merger effected through use of a false and mis-
leading proxy statement. Id. at 429. The Supreme Court held that private suits are per-
missible under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for violations of § 14(a). The 
Court stated that the federal courts will provide the remedies required to carry out the 
congressional purpose. Id. at 430-31, 33-35. 
25. Id. at 431-33. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 
'78n(a)(1982), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails 
or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange or otherwise 
to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy 
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other 
than an exempted security) registered on any national securi-
ties exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors. 
26. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432. 
27. Id. While the Court conceded that Congress did not explicitly declare that pri-
4
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valuable enforcement mechanisms which aided the SEC as it 
sought to review thousands of proxy solicitations each year.28 
The Warren Court's pro-plaintiff stand on implied private rights 
of action is best expressed in Borak when it stated that it is the 
duty of the courts to provide remedies whenever necessary to 
effectuate Congress' purpose.29 
This expansive attitude was again exhibited in Wyandotte 
Transportation Co. v. United States.30 Citing Borak as author-
ity, the Court stated that civil actions were proper when plain-
tiffs fell within the class that the statute was designed to protect 
and when the harm that occurred was the type that the statute 
was intended to forestall.31 
Private rights of action have ebbed considerably32 from the 
Borak holding since the Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash33 in 
1975. In Cort, the Burger Court established a four-part test for a 
judicial finding for an implied private right.34 The first part of 
the test requires the plaintiff to be "one of the class for whose 
especial benefit the statute was created."311 The second factor is 
congressional intent. That is, is there any indication that Con-
gress explicitly or implicitly intended either to create such a 
remedy or to deny one?36 Third, the entire surrounding legisla-
tive scheme must be examined to see whether a finding of a pri-
vate cause of action would disrupt Congress' statutory struc-
vate plaintiffs should have a private right of action under § 14(a), the congressional ref-
erence to "the protection of investors" was sufficient for the Court to imply the "availa-
bility of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." I d. 
28. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432. 
29. Id. at 433. 
30. 389 U.S. 191 (1967). Wyandotte involved the assertion of in personam rights by 
the federal government against the owners of two vessels negligently sunken in navigable 
waterways. Id. at 193. 
31. Id. at 202. 
32. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. See also Pillai, Negative Implica-
tion: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 
(1978); Note, A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 505 
(1980); Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes - the Emergence of a 
Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429 (1976). 
33. 422 U.S. 66 (1975)(plaintiff stockholder brought action for damages and injunc-
tive relief under the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 
610 (1982), which prohibit corporate contributions in specific federal elections). 
34. Cort, 422 U.S. at 69. 
35. Id. at 78, quoting Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). 
36. Cart, 422 U.S. at 78. 
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ture.37 Lastly, a determination must be made whether the cause 
of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area 
basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federallaw.38 
After Cort, the Supreme Court amplified and modified its 
restrictive stance regarding implied private rights of action in 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington,39 when it cautioned courts to 
be wary of broadening causes of action beyond those intended 
by Congress.40 In Reddington, the Court decided that each part 
of the Cort test was not of equal weight.41 Instead, the central 
inquiry was whether Congress intended, either expressly or by 
implication, to create a private right of action.42 This narrow 
posture was reiterated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. 
v. Lewis,43 where the Court stated that rules of construction re-
37.Id. 
38.Id. 
39. 442 U.S. 560 (1978). Plaintiff, trustee in the liquidation of a failed securities firm 
brought suit under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) 
(1970), which requires every member of a national securities exchange to keep such 
books and records as the Securities and Exchange Commission deems necessary for the 
protection of investors. Id. at 563. Defendant was the independent auditor of the securi-
ties firm. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the accountant's improper audit contributed to the 
losses suffered by customers of the securities firm. Reddington, 442 U.S. at 564-66. In 
holding that no private right of action existed under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, the Court declared that the statute's purpose was to provide the SEC with early 
warning of a securities firm's financial collapse and could not be construed to confer a 
private right of action. Id. at 568-71. The Court also found that the statute's legislative 
history was entirely silent on whether such a right existed and that other sections of the 
1934 Act contained explicit private causes of action. Id. at 571. In particular, it noted 
that § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)(1976) provides the principal express civil 
remedy for misstatements in reports but limits it to purchasers and sellers of securities. 
Id. at 573-74. 
40. Reddington, 422 U.S. at 574. 
41. Id. at 575. But see Id. at 579-89 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 580 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 575-76. The Court noted that the first three factors of the Cort test were 
the traditional inquiries into legislative intent. Id. Moreover, this inquiry was determina-
tive. Id. Once answered in the negative the entire discussion of a private right of action 
was at an end. Id. 
43. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). Plaintiff, a shareholder in Mortgage Trust of America 
(Trust) brought a derivative action on behalf of Trust and a class action on behalf of 
Trust's shareholders against Trust and its investment adviser alleging fraud and breach 
of fiduciary duty. Id. at 13. The Supreme Court held that the Investment Adviser's Act 
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1-80b-21 (1982), did not confer an implied private right for 
damages. The Court stated that though the clients of investment advisers were the in-
tended beneficiaries of the statute, enforcement through private actions for damages 
would unduly extend the remedies of recission and restitution that Congress intended. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. at 16-17. 
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quired that where a statute expressly provides a particular rem-
edy, a court must be careful of reading others into it." 
Following the restrictive Cort standard, the Court has been 
very reluctant to find an implied private right of action in stat-
utes where none was expressly provided. The Cort analysis as 
amplified and refined in Reddington and Lewis has had a broad 
effect, denying private rights of action under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act;"> section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appor-
priations Act,46 section 1 of the Davis-Bacon Act,47 section 1302 
of the Indian Civil Rights Act,48 and section 14(e) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act dealing with unsuccessful tender of-
fers.49 One of the few exceptions to this trend was Cannon v. 
44. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19. Supporting this proposition, the Court cited Botany Mills 
v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1928): "When a statute limits a thing to be done in a 
particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." 
45. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981). Plaintiffs, an organization of fishermen, brought suit against various governmen-
tal entities complaining of sewage being discharged into waterways. ld. at 4-5. The Court 
held that neither the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982), 
nor the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401-45 
(1982), granted a private right of action. Both acts contained elaborate enforcement 
mechanisms, including express citizen-suit provisions, and thus it "cannot be assumed 
that Congress intended to authorize additional judicial remedies." Middlesex County, 
453 U.S. at 13-14. 
46. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). An environmental organization 
and two other private plaintiffs sought enforcement of § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899. ld. at 289. The Supreme Court ruled that the general prohibition of certain 
activities does not indicate any intent by Congress to provide a private right of action. 
ld. at 297-98. 
47. Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981). In Coutu, plaintiff 
brought suit against former employer alleging violation of the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 
U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1982), which requires contractors on federal construction projects to 
pay laborers the prevailing local wage. Coutu, at 757. The Supreme Court held that it 
was not Congress' intent to grant an implied private right of action. ld. at 771-73. 
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). In Martinez, a female mem-
ber of an indian tribe brought action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
enforcement of a tribal ordinance denying membership in the tribe to children of female 
members who married outside the tribe, while extending membership to children of male 
members who married outside the tribe. ld. at 51. In holding that no private right of 
action exists under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982), the 
Court stated that such a right "would be at odds with the congressional intent of pro-
tecting tribal self-government." Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64. 
49. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Chris-Craft Industries was the 
unsuccessful tender offeror for control of a corporation and brought suit for damages and 
injunctive relief alleging violations of § 14(e) of the 1934 Exchange Act. ld. at 4. The 
Supreme Court held that a private right of action was not necessary to effectuate Con-
gess' intent under § 14(e). ld. at 37-41. 
7
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University of Chicago,GO a Title IX action where a female plain-
tiff alleged that she was denied admission to the medical schools 
of two private universities on the basis of her sex. Gl There the 
Court held that the plaintiff overcame each part of the Cort test 
quite easily because: (1) Title IX explicitly recognized the class 
of which plaintiff was a member as the group for whose benefit 
the measure was enacted; (2) the legislative history of Title IX 
clearly indicated Congress' intention that a private right of ac-
tion should be recognized by the courts; (3) the recognition of a 
private right of action, far from disrupting the overall legislative 
scheme, would further its underlying purpose by providing indi-
vidual citizens with effective protection against discriminatory 
practices and; (4) anti-discriminatory measures have been the 
province of the federal government since the enactment of the 
Civil War amendments. G2 
The issue as to whether a private plaintiff should have 
standing to sue for being defrauded or misled in the offer or sale 
of securities under section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act re-
mains an open one,GS with many circuits and lower courts recog-
nizing such an action,M but a trend to the contrary appears to be 
50. 441 u.s. 677 (1979). 
51. [d. at 680. 
52. [d. 
53. R JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 63, 
(6th ed. 1987). 
54. Many circuit and district courts have recognized an implied right of action 
under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. See Stephenson, supra note 20 at 815; 
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 
(1979)(retired schoolteacher sought order compelling retirement board to exchange 
poorly-rated, low-yield Municipal Assistance Corporation bonds for higher yielding 
bonds issued by creditworthy corporations); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 
561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)(union 
member brought action against local union to recover for misrepresentations made con-
cerning his rights in pension plan); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975)(pur-
chasers of oil and gas production interests brought action against seller alleging fraud in 
. the sale of securities); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1973)(in 
action for compensatory and punitive damages against former officers and directors of 
failed construction firm with whom plaintiff merged, the court held that requirements 
for a private cause of action under § 17(a) were identical to those under Rule 10b-5); 
Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971)(ac-
tion by stockholders to recover value of stock for alleged conspiracy of corporate officers 
and directors to sell shares at a profit after manipulating market in violation of § 17(a), § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Kellman v. ICS Inc., 447 F.2d 1305 (6th Cir. 1970){purchaser of 
common stock brought suit for damages over refund offered by corporation claiming that 
refund did not adequately measure consideration originally paid for such shares as prom-
ised by the corporation); Jacobs v. McCrory, [1986 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
8
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growing.1i1i 
(CCH) ~ 92,893 (D. Md. 1986)(investors brought action against adviser alleging violations 
of § 17(a), § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for misrepresenting the nature and volume of their 
investments); Ackerman, Jablonski, Porterfield & DeTure v. AIhadeff, [1986 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 92,756 (W.D. Wash. 1986)(investors in an oil and gas 
limited partnership brought suit against its organizers and its auditors alleging the pro-
spectus contained misrepresentations); Levine v. Futransky, 636 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. lli. 
1986)(beneficiaries/trustees of various trusts brought suit against investment adviser to 
recover losses arising from latter's unauthorized, risky trading strategy); Onesti v. Thom-
son McKinnon Sec., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. lli. 1985)(plaintiffs brought suit 
against securities firm for allegedly misrepresenting the riskiness of its investment rec-
ommendations and for charging excessive commission fees; in finding an implied right of 
action under § 17(a), the court cited the minimal differences between § 17(a) of the 1933 
Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act); Dannenberg v. Dorison, 603 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). In Dannenberg, investors sued to recover damages sustained from investment in a 
fraudulent limited partnership tax shelter, alleging that the offering memorandum was 
false and misleading since the partnership never intended to engage in mining activities 
necessary for creation of tax benefits. The court declined to allow private actions based 
on negligence despite the Supreme Court's ruling in SEC v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), 
that in an SEC enforcement action negligence was a sufficient basis to state a claim 
under § 17(a)(2) and § 17(a)(3). See also Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1985)(investor brought suit against securities firm 
under § 17(a), § 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices 
Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68 (1982) for excessive and unauthorized transactions which re-
sulted in more than $50,000 in commission expenses); Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 
F. Supp. 458 (N.D. lli. 1985)(investors in oil and gas leases brought suit against attorney 
alleging misrepresentation as leases were encumbered by numerous judgment and 
mechanics liens, mortgages and assignments when attorney claimed, with knowledge of 
their existence, that no such encumbrances existed); First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. 
National Republic Bank of Chicago, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 91,994 (N.D. lli. 1985)(bondholders of defaulted issue claimed fraud and misrepresen-
tation due to defendants' failure to disclose the financial interests of defendants in the 
properties to be developed with bond proceeds); Hanratty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096 
(10th Cir. 1972)(plaintiff suffered financial loss by following defendant's advice in ex-
changing all of his shares in one firm for a larger number of shares in another). 
55. Several circuit and district courts have refused to find an implied right of action 
under § 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. See Barnes v. Resource Royalties, Inc., 795 F.2d 
1359 (8th Cir. 1986)(investor claimed that he was fraudulently induced by defendant to 
purchase unregistered securities on the pretext that the corporations in which he was 
investing were developing and marketing new products); Landry v. All Am. Assurance 
Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982)(purchasers of bank common stock brought suit against 
underwriters and bank executives alleging that financial statements of bank were misrep-
resented); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1086 (1978)(customer sued brokerage firm and its branch manager to recover 
losses sustained in allegedly unauthorized stock speculation); Greater Iowa Corp. v. Mc-
Lendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff corporation alleged that dissident share-
holders violated § 5 of the Securites Act of 1933 by not registering voting trust certifi-
cates with the Securities and Exchange Commission and § 17(a) by making allegedly 
fraudulent statements in solicitation material); Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 639 F. 
Supp. 758 (W.D. Okla. 1986)(bank which bought loan participations brought securities 
fraud action against selling bank); Mursau Corp. v. Florida Penn Oil & Gas, Inc., 638 F. 
Supp. 259 (W.D. Pa. 1986)(investor in oil and gas limited partnership sued promoter 
alleging nondisclosure of material facts); David K. Lindemuth Co. v. Shannon Fin. Corp., 
9
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A private right of action under section 17(a) hardly seemed 
to matter when section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act.was seen 
as embodying a readily available implied right. Frequently, sec-
tion 17(a) was a mere "tag along" to a Rule 10b-5 claim.lls Due 
to the high degree of similarity in the language employed by the 
two statutes, a private plaintiff, defrauded in the purchase or 
sale of a security, was readily able to state a cause of action 
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.1I7 Section 17(a) actions 
brought by private plaintiffs were on occasion dismissed for be-
ing redundant when accompanied by a section 10(b) action. liS In 
Osborne v. Mallory,1I9 the first case to recognize a private right of 
637 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Cal. 1986)(purchasers of shares in pipe inspection equipment 
sued sellers alleging that inflated value of and market for such equipment constituted 
securities fraud); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 639 F. 
Supp. 108 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)(investor sued brokerage firm alleging failure to disclose 
risks and safeguard investor's interests, encouragement of excessive speculation and 
churning of account for commission income); Schriner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 635 F. 
Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1986)(buyer of revenue bonds brought action against seller after 
issuer of bonds declared bankruptcy); In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 630 F. 
Supp. 1072 (D. Colo. 1986)(plaintiffs alleged officers and directors of computer manufac-
turer concealed and misrepresented firm's financial condition and progress of new prod-
uct development); Akers v. Bonfasi, 629 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)(franchisee 
brought action against franchisor of mobile telephone equipment alleging violations of 
securities laws, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and state consumer 
protection laws); Braun v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 445 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 
600 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1979)(customer sued brokerage firm alleging, inter alia, that de-
fendant misrepresented the riskiness of plaintiff's investment portfolio). See also, Pillai, 
Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
56. See Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641, 648 (1978). 
57. A private right of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act was first recognized 
in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and was sanctioned 
by the Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
58. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Servs., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969). In 
Globus, shareholders charged the president of a corporation and an underwriter of a 
stock issue with federal securities law violations and common law fraud in connection 
with the offering circular accompanying the offer of the sale of stock. Id. at 1278-79. The 
court did not answer whether § 17(a) by itself would support a private right of action for 
compensatory damages since its affirmation of the lower court's ruling on this issue could 
stand under § 10(b). Id. at 1283; See also Schaeffer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 
1293 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). In Schaeffer, victims of a stock 
market manipulation brought an action against brokerage and stock exchange for fraud 
and misrepresentation in violation of federal securities laws. Id. at 1290. The court 
stated that where § 17(a) has been concurrently pleaded with a sufficient Rule 10b-5 
claim, courts should refrain from ruling on the sufficiency of the § 17(a) claim. Id. at 
1293. See also Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967). See also 
H. BLOOMENTHAL. SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK, (1985). 
59. 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The purchasers of common stock brought ac-
tion against sellers claiming fraud and misrepresentation in violation of federal securities 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/12
1988] SECURITIES LAW 231 
action under section 17(a), the Second Circuit's reasoning was 
little more than a recognition of this similarity.60 In denying de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, the court in Osborne merely deter-
mined that the reasons for implying liability under section 10(b) 
were equally applicable to section 17(a).61 So long as the section 
10(b) remedy was readily available to defrauded investors and 
other participants in the securities markets, the existence of a 
similar private action under section 17(a) or lack thereof made 
little practical difference.62 This relationship eroded dramati-
cally in the 1970s when the Supreme Court began limiting the 
section 10(b) private right of action by adding restrictions and 
qualifications. 
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,63 the Supreme 
Court adopted a standing requirement first imposed by the Sec-
ond Circuit in 1952 in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.6" Plain-
tiffs claimed in Birnbaum that they would have purchased the 
securities in question were it not for defendants' misleading and 
pessimistic prospectus.65 There, the Second Circuit held that a 
section 10(b) private plaintiff had to be either a purchaser or 
seller of the securities in question.66 In doing so, the Second Cir-
cuit gave a strict interpretation to the "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security" language contained in the 1934 
Act.67 
laws. Id. at 871. The court held that civil liability is implied under section 17(a) for 
fraudulent and deceptive practices in the sale of securities and a remedy is available 
despite the absence of specific language. Id. at 879. 
60. Osborne, 86 F. Supp. at 879. 
61. Id. Other cases adopting the analogy approach of Osborne are Dack v. Shanman, 
227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 
and Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
62. See Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act - The Wrong Place for a 
Private Right, 68 Nw. UL. REv. 44 nn. 12-15 (1973). 
63. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In Blue Chip Stamps, defendant corporation issued a pro-
spectus which, plaintiffs alleged, was misleading due to its unjustified pessimistic earn-
ings forecast. Id. at 726. Shares of common stock were being offered through a prospec-
tus to retailers at discounted prices pursuant to a settlement of a civil antitrust action 
brought by the United States. Id. at 726. Plaintiffs alleged that the gloomy prospectus 
was designed to discourage the retailers from purchasing the shares so that the shares 
could then be offered to the public at a higher price. Id. at 727. 
64. 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)(in action for 
fraud the court held that Rule lOb-ii provided a remedy only to actual purchasers and 
sellers of securities). 
65. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462-63. 
66. Id. at 463. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). 
11
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In Blue Chip Stamps, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a di-
vided court focused on four factors.68 First, the legislative his-
tory showed that Congress rejected attempts to include some-
thing less than a completed sale or purchase.69 Second, allowing 
a broader basis for standing for implied rights of action under 
rule 10b-5 would be inconsistent with the remedies explicitly in-
cluded in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.70 Third, a large body of case law supported the 
Birnbaum rule.71 Lastly, as a matter of public policy there was a 
strong need to avoid vexatious litigation that would result if 
mere offerees could bring suit.72 
Justice Powell's concurrence emphasized a literal interpre-
tation of the statutuory language.73 He characterized the plain-
tiff's arguments as a plea for judicial reconstruction of section 
10(b) to include offers along with purchases and sales74 and 
stated that such an alteration could only be made with the un-
mistakeable support in the legislation's history and structure.75 
Finding none76 and concerned as well about the chilling effect of 
overturning Birnbaum on the capital markets," Justice Powell 
68. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-46. 
69. [d. at 731-33. 
70. [d. at 731-36. The Court noted that § ll(a) of the 1933 Act confines the express 
cause of action to persons "acquiring such security." [d. at 736. Section 12 of the 1933 
Act provides a remedy limited to purchasers. [d. Section 9 of the 1934 Act, which prohib-
its a variety of fraudulent and manipulative devices, limits its express remedy to pur-
chasers and sellers in transactions violating the provision. [d. Lastly, § 18 of the 1934 
Act, prohibiting false and misleading statements in documents filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, provides a remedy available only to purchasers and sellers. 
[d. 
71. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-32. 
72. [d. at 737-46. The Court allowed that actual damages as required by § 28(a) of 
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(1982), in all private actions may be difficult to prove. 
However, in the normal case involving actual purchasers and sellers, such damages usu-
ally have a tangible basis in the number of shares bought or sold. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 
U.S. at 742. In contrast, the claim of the plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps, whose claim was 
based on a non-contractual opportunity to buy or sell, suffered only an intangible eco-
nomic injury and recovery would have involved a number of shares grounded only on 
plaintiff's uncorroborated oral evidence. [d. at 746. The Court stated that a more gener-
ous standing criterion would frustrate or delay normal business activity and would open 
the door to nuisance or strike suits, the resolution of which would be reduced to unverifi-
able oral recollections. [d. at 741-43. 
73. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (197g) (Powell, J., concurring). 
74. [d. at 756. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. at 760. 
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rejected plaintiff's arguments by deferring any standing expan-
sion to Congress.78 
Justice Blackmun in dissent characterized the Birnbaum 
standing restriction as a mechanical requirement quite out of 
keeping with the broad antifraud protection afforded by Con-
gress when it drafted section lO(b).79 He chided the majority's 
pursuit of expediency, convenience and ease 80 and offered, as a 
substitute for Birnbaum, a standing requirement satisfied by a 
showing of a "logical nexus between the alleged fraud and the 
sale or purchase of a security."81 
The restriction imposed in Blue Chip Stamps has drawn 
both support82 and criticism83 from commentators. The Supreme 
Court's ruling in Blue Chip Stamps seemed to put an end to the 
numerous exceptions to the Birnbaum rule created by the lower 
courts.8' These exceptions had led commentators to predict the 
rule's demise.811 However, there still remain some exceptions to 
the Court's restrictive standing criteria.86 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
80. Id. at 770. 
81. Id. 
82. See Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 
80 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
83. See Note, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act: An Alternative to the Re-
cently Restricted Rule 10b-5 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J 340 (1977). The author argues that the 
standing requirement adopted by the Court contradicts the broad remedial purposes of 
the 1933 Act and severely reduces the number and type of defrauded plaintiffs able to 
seek such relief under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 343. See also Hazen, A Look Beyond the Prun-
ing of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,64 
VA. L. REv. 641 (1978). The author notes with irony that the fear of vexatious litigation 
was unfounded in Blue Chip Stamps since the terms of the underlying antitrust consent 
decree could have easily limited the class of plaintiffs. Id. at 661 n.102. 
84. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973)(beneficiaries 
of a trust from which securities were sold had standing to sue); Crane Co. v. Westing-
house Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) 
(standing extended to tender offeror who suffered a defeat due to deception and manipu-
lation of defendant); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 
1972)(shareholders ousted from control of the corporation by means of an allegedly ille-
gal conspiracy involving a sale of securities had standing to sue). 
85. See e.g., Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 268 (1968); Comment, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls the 
Knell of Parting Day?", 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970). 
86. W. CARY AND M EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 808 (1980). 
Among the exceptions retaining some vitality are those involving forced sellers, pledgors 
or pledgees, and the plaintiff seeking injunctive relief. Id. 
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The standing requirement imposed by Blue Chip Stamps 
was supplemented by a scienter criterion when the Supreme 
Court decided Ernst and Ernst v. Hoch/elders' in 1976. In 
Hoch/elder, the Supreme Court held that the independent audi-
tors of a fraudulent securities firm were not subject to section 
10(b) liability for simple negligence in conducting an audit.88 A 
defrauded purchaser or seller of securities has to allege some 
higher standard of fault, either recklessness or intentional 
wrongdoing in order to state a cause of action.89 The Court 
noted that section 10(b) prohibited the "use or employment of 
'any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' in contra-
vention of Commission rules."90 It focused on the words "manip-
ulative or deceptive" in holding that Congress intended only to 
proscribe conduct involving a higher state of culpability than 
mere negligence.91 
Lastly, in 1977 the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries v. 
Green92 disallowed a section 10(b) action on the basis that the 
plaintiff failed to allege an act of "manipulation or deception. "93 
According to the majority, a short-form merger carried out with 
full disclosure does not violate section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 de-
spite the lack of prior notice or any justifiable business pur-
87. 425 u.s. 185 (1976). The plaintiffs, customers of a fraudulent securities firm, 
brought a section 10(b) action against firm's accountants for negligent failure to uncover 
fraud. [d. at 189-90. The Supreme Court held that no private right of action exists under 
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act absent an allegation of scienter. [d. at 208-10. 
88. [d. at 186. 
89. [d. at 188. The Court defined scienter as an intent to defraud, deceive or manip-
ulate. It expressly left open, however, whether reckless behavior constituted scienter. [d. 
at 193. 
90. [d. at 197. 
91. Id. 
92. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Minority investors in a corporation 95% owned by Santa Fe 
Industries (SFI) brought suit under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claiming SFI's buyout offer 
of $150 per share, although supported by an independent appraisal, was inadequate and 
represented an attempt to freeze-out the minority shareholders at an unfair price. [d. at 
467. The Court held: (1) only conduct involving manipulation and deception is reached 
by § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. [d. at 471-74; (2) the SFI offer fully complied with applicable 
state law and thus was not deceptive or manipulative. [d. at 474-77; and 3) to hold that 
plaintiffs' allegations constituted fraud would federalize corporate law, an area better left 
to the states. [d. at 477-80. 
93. [d. at 473. The Court noted that "manipulation" when used in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities, generally refers to "practices . . . that are intended to 
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." [d. No deception was found 
by the Court due to the lack of omissions or misstatements in the prospectus accompa-
nying the notice of merger. [d. 
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pose.94 The Court concluded that as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation, no evidence existed showing Congress intended to 
prohibit corporate activities which lacked manipulative or de-
ceptive conduct.911 Justice White, writing for the majority, re-
jected the argument that "fraud" found in Rule lOb-5 but not 
section lO(b), brought breaches of fiduciary duty within the 
scope of federal securities laws. 96 The Court stated that the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, in promulgating rules under 
section lO(b), was limited by the language of that statute.97 The 
Court ruled that state created causes of action for mismanage-
ment and other breaches of fiduciary duty were not cognizable 
under section lO(b).98 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
With this as its background, the Ninth Circuit in WPPSS99 
concluded that its previous decision in Stephenson v. Calpine 
Conifers II Ltd. loO was incorrect and was no longer controlling 
precedent in its circuit.10l In Stephenson, the Ninth Circuit had 
held that a private cause of action existed under section 17(a) 
and had relied on Kirshner v. United States,102 a Second Circuit 
opinion. The Kirshner court, in turn, had based its decision on 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.loa In Texas Gulf Sulphur, 
Judge Friendly stated in a concurring opinion that there was no 
real reason for denying the existence of an action under section 
94. ld. at 468. 
95. ld. at 473. 
96. ld. at 472-73. 
97. ld. at 472. 
98. ld. at 477, 479-80. 
99. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
100. 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra note 20. 
101. WPPSS, 823 F.2d 1349 at 1351. . 
102. 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). See supra 
note 54. The Second Circuit recognized a private cause of action under § 17(a) stating 
that the language of that statute was broad enough to imply such a right. ld. 
103. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, corporate insiders 
who purchased stock based on undisclosed material information were held liable for vio-
lations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982), under 
the "disclose or abstain" doctrine. ld. at 849. 
15
Mastromonaco: Securities Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988
236 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:221 
17(a) once a plaintiff established a private action under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Kirshner 
court, and indirectly, the Ninth Circuit in Stephenson, relied on 
this portion of Judge Friendly's opinion. Omitted from the 
Kirshner opinion, however, was Judge Friendly's proviso that 
"fraud as, distinct from mere negligence, must be alleged."104 
The Ninth Circuit, in reversing Stephenson, found this 
omission particularly important in light of the elevated stan-
dards for a private cause of action under section 10(b) that the 
Supreme Court had imposed in Blue Chip Stamps, Hochfelder, 
and Santa Fe Industries. lo15 The Ninth Circuit concluded that to 
permit section 17(a) actions to be governed by the lesser negli-
gence action as it had when it relied on Kirshner would be to 
allow plaintiffs to circumvent the Supreme Court's higher stan-
dards for culpability under section 10(b).lo6 Acknowledging the 
flawed reasoning underlying its previous position, along with the 
narrowed scope of implied private rights, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed Stephenson.lo7 
The Ninth Circuit continued its re-examination by declar-
ing that it had erred in Stephenson by not following the criteria 
established by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ashlo8 for deter-
mining whether a private right of action should be implied from 
a congressional statute that is silent on the matter.109 In particu-
lar, the Ninth Circuit focused on the second and third prongs of 
Cort, citing these factors as the determinative elements accord-
ing to Reddington and another recent Supreme Court affirma-
tion of CortYo The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether plain-
tiffs inWPPSS satisfied the first prong of the Cort test because 
their failure to show congressional intent and harmony with the 
104. Kirshner, 603 F.2d at 241. 
105. Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 
(1977). 
106. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1352. 
107. Id. at 1358. . 
108. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
109. Id. at 78. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
110. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). In Russell, an 
employee of defendant insurance company sued under the Employee Retirement and 
Income Security Act (ERISA) and state law, alleging improper termination of disability 
benefits. Id. at 137. The Supreme Court held that no private right of action exists under 
ERISA due to strong evidence of legislative intent to the contrary. Id. at 148. 
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overall statutory program precluded, in the court's view, the rec-
ognition of a private cause of action under section 17(a).1ll 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of congressional intent, 
the second prong of the Cort test, by examining the "plain" lan-
guage of section 17(a)112 and determined that there simply was 
no indication, explicit or implicit, of legislative intent to create a 
private right of action under section 17(a).113 It read section 
17(a) as representing merely a general censure of fraudulent 
practices.ll4 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an ex-
amination of the statute's legislative history failed to support a 
private right of action. IllS As pointed out in Gunter v. Hutche-
son,116 when the House Committee Report listed the sections 
that created and defined the civil liabilities imposed by the 1933 
Securities Act117 it referred only to sections 11 and 12.118 Con-
gress felt that to impose a greater responsiblity than that pro-
vided by these sections would unnecessarily hamper honest busi-
nessmen and provide no offsetting advantage to the public.119 
In discussing legislative scheme, (the third prong to the 
Cort test), the majority cited the views of Professor Louis Loss. 
Professor Loss saw the 1933 Securities Exchange Act as a "neat 
111. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1354. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1355. 
114. Id. at 1354. For authority, the court cited Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981), wherein 
the Supreme Court held that a private right of action did not exist under the Davis· 
Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1982). In its discussion the Court in Coutu stated: 
[Tlhe fact that an enactment is designed to benefit a par-
ticular class does not end the inquiry; instead it must also be 
asked whether the language of the statute indicates that Con-
gress intended that it be enforced through private litigation 
• • • The Court has consistently found that Congress intended 
to create a cause of action 'where the language of the statute 
explicitly confers a right directly on a class of persons that 
includes the plaintiff in the case.' 
Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-72 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 at 690 n.13 (1979), supra notes 
50-52). 
115. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1355. 
116. 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Action for fraud in the sale of stock in a bank. 
The district court, citing the restrictive Cort test and the requirements imposed in 
Hochfelder, Blue Chip Stamps and Santa Fe Industries, held that no private right of 
action should be implied under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 44. 
119. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42 (N.D_ Ga. 1977) citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). 
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pattern" whose two substantive provisions, sections 5120 and 
17(a), had sections 11121 and 12(2)122 as their respective enforce-
ment mechanisms.123 According to Professor Loss, recognition of 
a private right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and 
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder124 makes sense, whereas a 
similar remedy under section 17(a) is impermissible because of 
the differing scope of the two acts.125 While the 1933 Act deals 
120. Section 5 of tbe 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), makes it unlawful to sell any 
nonexempt security that is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Id. 
121. Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982), holds all participants in a 
registered offering under the Act potentially liable to purchasers of the securities for any 
material omissions or misstatements in the registration statement. See Ha2en, A Look 
Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641, 644 n.14 (1978). 
122. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), provides that a pur-
chaser may sue a seller of securities for material misstatements or omissions made in the 
offer or sale of securities. 
123. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1785-86, (2d. ed. 1961). 
124. Rule 10b-5 provides as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). 
125. Regarding the propriety of implying a private right of action under § 10(b) of 
the 1934 Act, and § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Professor Loss explained the interrelationship 
of the statutory provisions as follows: 
The question is simply whether there is the same justifi-
cation for implying such liablity under the 1933 Act as there is 
under the 1934 Act. It is one thing to imply a private right of 
action under § 10(b) or the other provisions of the 1934 Act, 
because the specific liabilities created by §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18 
do not cover all the variegated activities with which that Act is 
concerned. But it is quite another thing to add an implied 
remedy under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act to the detailed remedies 
specifically created by §§ 11 and 12. The 1933 Act is a much 
narrower statute. It deals only with disclosure and fraud in 
the sale of securities. It has but two important substantive 
provisions, §§ 5 and 17(a). Non-compliance with § 5 results in 
civil liability under § 12(1). Faulty compliance results in liabil-
ity under § 11. And § 17(a) has its counterpart in § 12(2). It all 
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only with disclosure and fraud in the sale of securities, the 1934 
Act is much broader and the specific liabilities expressly pro-
vided by Congress, sections 11 and 12(2), do not cover all the 
1934 Act's substantive provisions.126 To recognize a private right 
of action under section 17(a) would thus disrupt the balance of 
the 1933 Act by rendering section 11 entirely superfluous. Addi-
tionally, "the complex scheme which Congress wove in express 
civil liability sections would be totally undermined. "127 
The last major portion of the majority opinion discussed the 
question of legislative re-enactment, a doctrine espoused in Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran.128 This doc-
trine states "when Congress acts in a statutory context in which 
an implied remedy has already been recognized by the courts 
. . . the question is whether Congress intended to preserve the 
pre-existing remedy."129 An implied remedy is seen as receiving 
tacit legislative support if it had been widely recognized by the 
makes a rather neat pattern. Within the area of §§ 5 and 
17(a), §§ 11 and 12 (unlike §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18 of the 1934 
Act) are all embracing. This is not to say that the remedies 
afforded by §§ 11 and 12 are complete. But the very restric-
tions contained in those sections and the differences between 
them . . . make it seem the less justifiable to permit plaintiffs 
to circumvent the limitations of § 12 by resort to § 17(a). Par-
ticularly is this so in view of the fact that § 11, together with 
the statute of limitations in § 13, was actually tightened in the 
1934 amendments to the Securities Act. [Emphasis in 
original.] 
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1785-86, (2d ed. 1961). 
126. [d. 
127. WPPSS, 823 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 quoting Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 
487 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In Kimmel, the district court adopted the statutory construction 
and the reasoning of the courts who refused to imply a private right of action under § 
17(a). [d. at 483. It applied its own Cort analysis and concluded that although § 17(a) 
met the first prong, namely, that purchasers of securities were among the class for whose 
especial benefit the statute was created, its failure to clear the second hurdle, legislative 
intent, proved fatal for the implied right. [d. at 487. The court in Kimmel also stated 
that the implication of a private right of action under § 17(a) would "undermine the 
complex and carefully crafted" legislative scheme found in the 1933 Act and would 
render §§ 11 and 12 superfluous. [d. 
128. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). In Curran, a customer brought an action against a futures 
commissions merchant, alleging mismanagement, misrepresentations, and excessive 
"churning" in connection with the management of its account. [d. at 368. The Court 
focused on the state of the law when the statute was enacted and held that an implied 
private cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982) was 
a part of the contemporary legal context when Congress legislated in 1974. Curran, 456 
U.S. at 392-95. 
129. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1357. 
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courts at the time Congress re-enacted a substantive portion of 
the underlying statutes.130 The majority in WPPSS distin-
guished Curran by stating that at the time Congress comprehen-
sively revised the securities laws in 1975, the existence of a right 
of action for private plaintiffs under section 17(a) of the 1933 
Securities Act was greatly disputed by the circuits.13l By con-
trast, in Curran, the Supreme Court held a private plaintiff's 
right to sue under the Commodity Exchange Act132 was part of 
the contemporary legal context in 1964 when Congress amended 
the Act at that time.l33 
B. THE DISSENT 
In his dissent,134 Judge Tang conducted his own Cart analy-
sis and concluded135 that a private right of action is implied 
under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.136 He began by 
stating that section 17(a) satisfies the first requirement of Cart, 
namely, that the plaintiff seeking the implied remedy be "one of 
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."137 
Judge Tang buttresses this conclusion by quoting language from 
the congressional debate over the 1933 Act to the effect that the 
legislation's main purpose is to protect the investing public by 
compelling disclosure of material facts and by preventing fraud 
and misrepresentation.138 
Judge Tang then proceeded to the second factor of the Cart 
test, legislative intent, and concluded that this too was satisfied 
130. Id. at 1356. 
131. Id. 
132. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). 
133. Curran, 456 U.S. at 374-82. The Court also stated that the decision by Con-
gress to leave intact the clauses under which courts had implied this private right of 
action implied a congressional intent to preserve the remedy. Id. at 384-87. The Court 
also found that the Act's legislative history supported this implication and clearly 
showed that purchasers and sellers of futures contracts were intended to have standing. 
Id. at 390. Due to these factors the Court held that a private plaintiff does have a right 
of action under the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 395. 
134. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 
(Tang, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. 
136. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1981). 
137. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1358. 
138. Id. at 1358 quoting 77 CONGo BEe. 2923 (May 8, 1933) (remarks of Sen. 
Fletcher). 
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by section 17(a).139 Though the statute's history offered little in-
dication of Congress' intent,140 Judge Tang found support for 
this conclusion by emphasizing the legislative re-enactment 
found in Curran.141 This doctrine is pertinent to the question of 
a private plaintiff's right of action under section 17(a) due to the 
comprehensive revision by Congress of the securities laws in 
1975. At the time of this revision the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits accepted private plaintiffs' 
rights of action under section 17(a) either at the trial or appel-
late level.142 Had Congress intended to disavow any private right 
139. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1358. 
140.Id. 
141. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). See 
supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
142. Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Shanman involved an ac-
tion for the return of the purchase price of securities. Id. at 28. Plaintiffs alleged viola-
tion of § 5(a) of the 1933 Act [interstate sale of securities prior to filing of a registration 
statement], violation of § 5(c) of the 1933 Securities Act [no registration statement] and 
violation of § 12 of the 1933 Act [untrue statements and material omissions in the pro-
spectus] under § 17(a). Id. at 28-29. The district court held that a private right of action 
under § 17(a) is to be implied from the fact that the section makes it unlawful in the sale 
of securities to employ a scheme to defraud or to obtain money by means of untrue 
statements of material fact. Id. at 29. See also Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). In Thiele, purchasers of municipal bonds brought an action for dam-
ages and recission, alleging that the offering circular contained material misrepresenta-
tions concerning revenues to be generated by the project. Id. at 418. While noting that § 
17(a) does not expressly provide for a private right of action, the district court held that 
such a right could be implied from prohibitions contained in this section. Id. at 419. The 
court also held that if a plaintiff could prove that defendant knowingly or intentionally 
misrepresented the bonds, a private plaintiff may maintain an action under Rule 10b-5 
and § 17(a). Id. Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Pfeffer was a 
private action for damages incurred by purchasers of stock arising from defendant's false 
statements of material fact. Id. at 757. Citing Osborne, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) 
and Thiele, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court in Pfeffer held that a private 
right of action was no longer an open question in its district. Pfeffer, 223 F. Supp. at 757. 
Wulc v. Gulf & Western Ind., 400 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Wulc, a corporate 
officer who held options to purchase stock in a corporation acquired by Gulf & Western 
brought action for violations of federal securities laws and common law fraud, alleging 
that Gulf & Western deceived him into supporting the merger by falsely assuring him of 
their willingness to assume liability for the stock options when they had no intention of 
doing so. Id. at 101-02. The district court, pointing to the "offer or sale" language of § 
17(a) as the vital distinction between the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, granted standing to a private plaintiff 
under § 17(a). Id. at 103. See Cromwell v. Pittsburgh and L. E. R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 1303 
(E.D. Pa. 1972), in which minority shareholders brought suit against majority stock-
holder alleging violations of federal securities laws and state corporate law in the financ-
ing of railroad cars which were purchased from defendant by majority stockholder. Id. at 
1305. After finding that conditional sales contracts constituted securities for purposes of 
the 1934 Act, the district court held that § 17(a) gives rise to a private right of action, 
stating that courts which have faced the issue squarely have come to this conclusion. Id. 
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of action under section 17(a) it surely would have done so ex-
pressly, particularly in light of the widespread recognition given 
to such claims in six of the federal circuits. Instead, Congress 
left section 17(a) unchanged.143 It is unlikely that this was a 
mere oversight. Congress' silence on this issue, as stated by 
Judge Tang, "evidences an intent to preserve the remedy" al-
ready accepted by the courts.144 
The third part of the Cort test, consistency with the under-
lying purposes of the legislative scheme,145 is also satisfied by a 
private right of action under section 17(a), according to Judge 
Tang.146 Stating simply that the purpose of federal securities 
laws is the encouragement of private enforcement,147 Judge Tang 
concluded that section 17(a) was consistent with the overall stat-
utory scheme because private actions are effective enforcement 
mechanisms and necessary supplements to the actions of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.148 Moreover, the presence of 
explicit civil remedies in section 11149 and section 121150 of the 
1933 Securities Act does not make a private right of action 
under section 17(a) redundant as contended by the majority.lI5l 
at 1310. See also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974), in which a buyer sought recission of the purchase of oil and 
gas production interests, alleging the seller had misrepresented and omitted material 
facts. Larson v. Tony's Investments, Inc., [1967-69 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'f 92,324 (M.D. Ala. 1968). In Larson, class action plaintiffs sued for violations of 
federal securities laws claiming defendant sold unregistered securities in more than one 
state in violation of § 12(1) of the 1933 Act, and that the prospectus under which such 
securities were sold contained omissions of material facts, thus violating § 12(2) and § 
17(a) of the 1933 Act. [d. at 97,530. The district court stated that the weight of authority 
supported a private right of action under § 17(a). [d. at 97,532. The court also noted that 
although plaintiffs' § 17(a)(2) theory was based on the same facts as their § 12(2) claim, 
the former was not duplicative since punitive damages are recoverable under § 17(a). See 
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 422 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970)(action by customer against brokerage firm and its commodities 
manager for alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and the Commodity Exchange Act). 
143. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1359 (Tang, J., dissenting). 
144. [d. 
145. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
146. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1359 (Tang, J., dissenting). 
147. [d. 
148. [d, quoting Bateman, Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 
(1985). 
149. See supra note 121. 
150. See supra note 122. 
151. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1359 (Tang, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Tang cited Cannon v. University of Chicago/52 for the 
proposition that the existence of explicit remedies in one or 
more sections of a complex statutory scheme should not pre-
clude the implication of appropriate remedies under other sec-
tions.153 Judge Tang concluded his independent analysis of a pri-
vate right of action in section 17(a) under the Cort test by citing 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers v. Lewis/54 to support his con-
clusion that regulation of misconduct in the securities field is 
not a concern peculiar to the states.155 
The dissent ended by chiding the majority's technical and 
restrictive view of federal securities lawsl56 and echoing Justice 
Blackmun's lament in Blue Chip Stamps/57 that the "Court ex-
hibits a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and 
a seeming callousness toward the investing public quite out of 
keeping. . . with our own traditions and the intent of the secur-
ities laws."158 
v. CRITIQUE 
The CortI 59 test for implication of a private cause of action 
was misapplied by the Ninth Circuit in WPPSS. Regarding the 
test's threshold requirement, namely, that the plaintiff be a 
member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted/60 the court viewed section 17(a) as an undifferentiated 
whole and failed to look at each subsection separately.161 In 
Cannonl62 the Supreme Court concluded that to satisfy the first 
prong of the Cort test a statute must explicitly confer a right on 
a class of persons that included the plaintiff.163 The mere fact 
152. 441 u.S. 677 (1979). See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
153. [d. at 711. 
154. 444 U.S. 11, 35 (1979). See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
155. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1360 (Tang J., dissenting). 
156. [d. 
157. 441 U.S. 723 (1975). See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
158. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1360-61 (Tang, J., dissenting) quoting Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blaclanun, J., dissenting). 
159. Cort v. Ash, 421 U.S. 66 (1975). 
160. [d. at 78. 
161. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1359-60 
(1987). 
162. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See supra notes 50-52 
and accompanying text. 
163. [d. at 690 n.13. 
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that a class of persons benefit from the legislation is insufficient 
by itself to confer standing on private parties.164 Instead, explicit 
congressional intent must be shown.161> Subsection 17(a)(3), 
which prohibits fraud or deceit "upon the purchaser" specifically 
designates a particular group for protection while subsections 
17(a)(l) and 17(a)(2) are general prohibitions with no particular 
beneficiary.166 Those commentators that see section 17(a) fulfil-
ling the first prong of the Cort test limit their affirmative finding 
to subsection 17(a)(3) and would grant standing to actual pur-
chasers.167 This result does not conflict with the standing rule 
adopted in Blue Chip Stamps and fulfills the requirement of 
sufficient specificity as set forth in Cannon. 
The second part of the Cort test is an inquiry into congres-
sional intent.16s That is, does the legislation provide any indica-
tion, explicitly or implicitly, either to create such a remedy or to 
deny one.169 An examination of section 17(a) reveals no intent to 
164. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). See supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text. 
165. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. 
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of 
any securities by the use of any means or instrunIents of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by 
the use of the mails directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon the purchaser. 
Offerees are also protected by § 17(a), but the Supreme Court has denied standing 
to offerees in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), supra note 
63, and it is unlikely that the Court would deny standing to offerees under Rule 10b-5 
only to allow it under § 17 (a). Although it is possible for the result in Blue Chip Stamps 
regarding offerees to be distinguished by the fact that Rule 10b-5 prohibits only fraudu-
lent activity in connection with the purchase or sale of any security while § 17(a) explic-
itly covers offerees, the same concerns over vexatious litigation and problems of proof are 
present in both. 
167. See Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 
Section 17(a), 14 J. OF L. REF. 563, 575 n.80 (1981); Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933: Implication of a Private Right of Action, 29 U.CLA L. REv. 244, 258 n.92 
(1981). 
168. Cart, 422 U.S. at 78. 
169. Id. 
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create a private cause of action and the statute's history lacks 
any such discussion.170 When discussing civil liabilities under the 
Securities Act of 1933, Congress focused on sections 11 and 
12.171 However, to imply that Congress intended to deny a pri-
vate right of action would be to adopt the maxim of statutory 
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (the expres-
sion of one thing is the exclusion of others)172 which was rejected 
in Cort.173 
In favor of finding congressional intent to 'provide a right of 
action under section 17(a) is the fact that when Congress 
amended the federal securities laws in 1975 it left section 17(a) 
unchanged.174 At that time, the majority of the circuits that had 
decided the issue were in favor of finding a private right of ac-
tion under section 17(a).175 Under the doctrine of statutory re-
enactment as set forth by the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner and Smith v. Curran,176 these facts infer a con-
gressional purpose to keep the private right of action under sec-
tion 17(a) entact. At best, the legislative history of section 17(a), 
before and since its enactment, is inconclusive on the issue of 
congressional intent regarding a private right of action.177 With-
out a more definitive showing that Congress intended to negate 
it, the second part of the Cort test will not prove fatal to a pri-
vate right of action under section 17(a).178 
The third factor in the Cort test weighs the effect of an im-
plied private right on the overall statutory scheme to insure that 
Congress' underlying purposes are preserved.179 In later cases 
170. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Congo 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). 
171. Id. 
172. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 521 (5th ed. 1979). 
173. Cort, 422 U.S. at 82 n.14. 
174. WPPSS, 823 F.2d at 1359 (Tang, J., dissenting). 
175. See supra note 142. 
176. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
177. See Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private 
Right of Action, 29 U.C.LA. L. REV. 244, 259 n.106 (1981). The author considers the 
element of congressional intent a "neutral factor" in determining a private right of ac-
tion under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. [d. 
178. In Cort, 422 U.S. 65, the Supreme Court stated that in cases where the class of 
plaintiffs was clearly granted certain rights, legislative intent to create a private right of 
action need not be shown but an "explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be 
controlling." I d. at 82. 
179. Id. at 78. 
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the Court recast this inquiry in less demanding language, requir-
ing only that the implication of a private remedy help accom-
plish the statutory purpose. ISO To the extent that a private right 
of action furthers the protection of investors without restricting 
the raising of capital or the conduct of honest business people, it 
aids the fulfillment of the statutory purpose. However, if a pri-
vate right of action under section 17(a) conflicts with the statu-
tory provisions where Congress explicitly granted a civil action 
to private plaintiffs, it would be inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme and fail to satisfy the third prong of Cort. Some com-
mentatorslSl have objected to standing for private plaintiffs 
under section 17(a) on this basis. They argue that section 
12(2)1S2 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides the remedy for a 
section 17(a) violation. To permit a separate action under sec-
tion 17(a) would duplicate the remedy provided by section 12(2) 
but would lack its limitations. ISS 
The persuasiveness of this argument is undermined by the 
fact that the overlap between section 17(a) and section 12(2) is 
incomplete. Section 17(a) requires the plaintiff to sustain the 
burden of proof unlike section 12(2), which places the burden on 
the defendant. Section 17(a) also lacks the privity requirement 
found in section 12(2).lS4 Lastly, section 12(2) is subject to the 
short one year statute of limitations found in section 13 while 
section 17(a) is not. lSI> 
180. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). 
181. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 1784-85 (2d ed. 1961). 
182. See supra note 122. 
183. Section 12(2) actions are subject to the one year statute of limitations found in 
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982), and are also subject to a privity requirement, 15 U.S.C. § 
771(2) (1982), i.e. purchasers can only sue their sellers. 




(2) offers or sells a security . • • in interstate commerce 
. . . by means of a prospectus . . . which includes an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading 
. • • and who shall not sustain the ~urden of proof that he did 
not know • . . of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to 
the person purchasing such security from him. . • 
185. Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m, states in pertinent 
part: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 11 or 
section 12(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement 
or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reason-
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These differences indicate that a private right of action 
under section 17(a) would not supplant the remedy provided by 
section 12(2). For example, an investor, defrauded in the 
purchase of securities, suing his seller within one year after his 
cause of action arose would certainly opt for section 12(2) be-
cause the burden of proof is placed by that section on the de-
fendant. Section 17(a) would only be chosen as the basis for a 
private action when it is necessary to avoid the one year statute 
of limitations or where the privity requirement could not be ful-
filled. To do so, however, the plaintiff must be able to sustain 
the burden of proof. At least one commentator believes that 
Congress imposed the privity requirement and short statute of 
limitations on section 12(2) actions in exchange for the unusual 
burden of proof placed on the defendant.ls6 Thus, since section 
17(a) and section 12(2) address different factual circumstances 
the overlap between them is incomplete. As a result, a section 
17(a) action does not displace section 12(2) and would not, 
therefore, be inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme. 
The Securities Act of 1933 has two major goals: complete 
disclosure to investors of all material information regarding the 
public sale of new issues of securities, and the prohibition of 
fraud in connection with the sale of such securities.187 The 
added enforcement mechanism provided by section 17(a) under 
the limited factual circumstances described above may provide 
an incremental inducement to an issuer to comply with this goal. 
With no additional costs associated with this inducement, any 
chilling effect on the raising of capital would likely be 
insignificant. 
The last part of the Cart test simply asks whether the cause 
of action is in an area that is a traditional concern of the states 
able diligence." Id. Obviously, since the right of action under § 17(a) is an implied one, 
the Act's statute of limitaions contains no reference to § 17(a). However, one commenta-
tor feels that it would be preferable from a policy point of view to adopt the short stat-
ute of limitaions of § 13 for private rights of action under § 17(a) as a trade-off against 
the more stringent requirements imposed on private actions brought under Rule 10b-5. 
Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) 
of the Securities Act of 1933,64 VA. L. REv. 641, 688 nn.243-45 (1978). 
186. Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private 
Right of Action, 29 U.C.LA L. REV. 244, 262 (1981). 
187. R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, SECURITIES REGuLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 63 
(6th ed. 1987). 
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and not the federal government. ISS Securities laws regulate activ-
ities that have been primarily a federal concern for more than 
fifty years. Indeed, a major thrust for the passage of the Securi-
ties Act was the states' inability to adequately cope with sEwuri-
ties fraud.ls9 A private right of action under section 17(a) would 
not invade a preserve of the individual states and, therefore, ful-
fills the final prong of the Cort test. Thus, a closer examination 
of the compatibility of section 17(a) with the Supreme Court's 
four part test argues in favor of a private right of action under 
section 17(a) and against the majority's position in WPPSS. 
Over and above the majority's interpretation of and reliance 
upon the Supreme Court's rigid Cort test, the best argument in 
favor of finding a private right of action under section 17(a) lies 
in an open recognition of the true purposes of the Securities Act 
of 1933: prevention of fraud and protection for the investing 
public.190 That these are important federal interests cannot be 
denied. The smooth functioning of the nation's capital markets 
is essential not only for the health and well being of the U.S. 
economy but that of the interdependent global economy as well. 
These goals cannot be achieved without preserving the highest 
level of investor confidence. Such confidence is diminished, if 
not lost altogether, if investors, wronged by perceived or actual 
fraud and misrepresentation lack a necessary and useful remedy. 
Thus, national and individual interests will often be intertwined 
and both will be served when mischief in the securities markets 
is uncovered and punished. This policy was reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court in 1964 in Borakl91 and more recently in Bate-
man, Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,192 when the Court 
stated that "implied private actions provide a 'most effective 
weapon in the enforcement' of the securities law and are a nec-
essary supplement to Commission action. "193 
188. Cart, 422 U.S. at 78. 
189. See Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 
Section 17(A), 14 J. OF L. REF. 563, 579-80 n.108 (1981); Note, Section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private Right of Action, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244, 
263 n.92 (1981). 
190. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), 77 Congo Rec. 2983 (May 8, 
1933)(remarks of Sen. Fletcher). 
191. Borak, 377 U.S. 426. 
192. 472 U.S. 299 (1985). 
193. Bateman, 472 U.S. at 310 quoting J.I. Case V. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
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The holding in WPPSS, coupled with the restrictions im-
posed on private plaintiffs by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip 
Stamps, Hoch/elder, and Santa Fe Industries, runs counter to 
the underlying purposes of the federal securities laws. Legisla-
tive reform is necessary to undo these restrictions, protect the 
investing public and achieve the legislative purposes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that a private right of action does 
not exist under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.194 
With this decision the Ninth Circuit joined a growing trend 
within the circuits.195 It also aligned itself with the Supreme 
Court's restrictive attitude in implication cases generally198 and 
private rights of action in securities cases in particular.197 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has avoided ruling on a private plain-
tiff's right of action under section 17(a).198 Even under the 
Court's restrictive standard for implying private rights of action 
an implied right can be found in section 17(a). This interpreta-
tion is more consistent with the underlying purposes of the fed-
eral securities acts and is necessary to encourage compliance 
with the antifraud provisions and to assure investor confidence 
in the securities markets. These important goals are undermined 
by the Ninth Circuit's holding in WPPSS and private plaintiffs 
will find it increasingly difficult to gain standing under the pro-
tective provisions of the Securities Acts. 
Peter A. Mastromonaco * 
194. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
195. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 63-98 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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